In this paper we present for the first time a framework that allows secure two-party computations on approximations of real valued signals. In our solution, we use a quantized logarithmic representation of the signal samples, which enables to represent both very small and very large numbers with bounded relative error. We show that numbers represented in this way can be encrypted using standard homomorphic encryption schemes; furthermore we give protocols that allow to perform all arithmetic operations on such encrypted values. Finally we demonstrate the practicality of our framework by applying it to the problem of filtering encrypted signals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the ever increasing amount of digitally stored data, there is a growing need for technical solutions that protect sensitive personal information. In the past, data privacy was mainly assured through procedures, laws or access control policies. However, these protection mechanisms are ineffective once data is outsourced to partially untrusted servers or processed by third parties. To alleviate this problem, special Privacy Enhancing Technologies have been proposed that allow to keep sensitive data encrypted and compute directly on encrypted values using cryptographic protocols [1] , [2] . This strategy allows to control, by design of the protocols, the amount of sensitive data that is leaked to the protocol participants. Commonly, these constructions use techniques from Secure Multiparty Computation [3] , [4] , which offers various protocols to compute securely with data represented as integers.
However, many computational problems require processing of very small non-integer values, some of them in the range of 10 −1 to 10 −300 or even smaller. The most prominent examples are applications that require processing of probabilities over large sets of events, such as dynamic programming algorithms, where a large number of probabilities have to be multiplied. Other problems require computing with values taken from a large interval such as [2 −100 , 2 100 ], where the relative representation error should be constant. Standard tools from Secure Multiparty Computation provide rather efficient ways to perform computations on integer values; implicitly, these tools also allow to compute on rational numbers of a fixed precision (by representing the numerator and denominator separately) and on integers in fixed point representation (by appropriate scaling and quantization). However, these frameworks usually cannot be used for the above-mentioned problems, as they cannot represent very small values; furthermore, rounding errors accumulate once a large number of operations are performed. We strive for a solution that provides numerical stability, where computations can be performed on arbitrarily small or large numbers with finite precision, but yield results as if they were computed with standard floating-point arithmetic.
In this paper we present a computational framework which allows two semi-honest parties to perform secure computations on values which come from a bounded real interval D = [− ; ]. While we refrain (for performance reasons) from implementing standard floating point encodings, we do use a representation that shares the most important properties of floating point arithmetic, i.e., values in D close to zero are represented with higher accuracy than larger values, yielding a bounded relative error, regardless whether representing very small or very large values. We further demonstrate the practicality of our framework through a series of tests. In particular, we perform measurements of the communication and computation complexity for various parameter sizes; furthermore, we show that for a concrete scenario (namely a digital filter) that our representation of numbers does not degrade the results significantly when compared to a reference implementation.
II. RELATED WORK AND BUILDING BLOCKS
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). Several constructions for Secure Multiparty Computation [3] , [4] and Secure Function Evaluation [5] , [4] are known in the literature. In the latter case, a set of players evaluate a given function on their private inputs; while the result of the function should be available for everyone, the parties do not want to share their inputs with each other. Various approaches for securely evaluating a function have been developed for different function representations, namely combinatorial circuits [5] , [6] , Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams [7] , branching programs [8] , or one-dimensional look-up tables [9] . While these methods target computations performed over the integers only, extensions were proposed that can handle rational numbers [10] and real values in fixed point notation [11] . The problem of computing securely with non-integer values in a numerically stable way, as presented in this paper, is still unsolved.
The availability of efficient SMC methods stimulated their use to protect privacy of valuable data. For example, several solutions have been proposed that use SMC to enhance privacy in auctions [12] , data clustering [13] , [14] or filtering [15] . Recently, there is also an increased interest in combining SMC with methods of signal processing in order to be able to privately analyze signals; examples are the analysis of medical signals [16] or the evaluation of biometrics on encrypted data [2] . All these systems currently rely on a fixed-point representation of the signals.
Paillier cryptosystem. As a central cryptographic tool, we use a semantically secure additively homomorphic public-key encryption scheme introduced by Paillier [17] . Let n = pq of size k, with p, q distinct prime numbers and k in the range of 1000-2048 bits. Also let g = n + 1. To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, one selects a random value r ∈ Zn and computes the ciphertext c = (mn + 1)r n = g m r n mod n 2 . We will write the encryption of a message m in the Paillier cryptosystem as [m] . Since all encryptions in the proposed protocols will be computed using one fixed public key, we do not specify the key explicitly. It is easy to see that the Paillier encryption scheme is additively homomorphic: 
This problem is a variant of Yao's Millionaire's Problem and has extensively been studied in the literature; for example, an optimized protocol in the above scenario can be found in [2] . Such an operation further allows to compute the minimum of the two values a and b in an oblivious way.
Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function Evaluation (OPRF).
An OPRF is a two-party protocol, where one party holds a secret key k and the second party wishes to evaluate a pseudo-random function FPRF(k, x) on a value x. The evaluation is oblivious in the sense that the party holding the key k does not learn x, while the other party only obtains FPRF(k, x) and has no knowledge of k [18] , [19] , [20] .
III. PRIVATE FUNCTION EVALUATION
In this section we describe a protocol which will be the basis of our framework for secure computations on non-integer values. In particular, we give a two-party protocol which allows parties A and B to evaluate any complex function f :
in a private way: This primitive allows to evaluate f on an encryption [x] of a value x ∈ X, producing an encryption [f (x)], while keeping x and f (x) secret from both parties. We will assume that party B holds an homomorphic encryption [x], whereas party A knows the correct decryption key and assists in the computations. We further assume that all values are encrypted in the Paillier encryption scheme, thus messages come from the plaintext space Zn for some RSA modulus n (see Section II).
Our approach is based on the oblivious evaluation of a pseudorandom function and consists of two phases: one initialization and one evaluation phase. In the initialization phase, A generates a prime number p in a way that n | (p − 1) and an element g of order n in Zp. A further selects a random element k ∈ Zn. These choices assure that gx = g 1 k+x (mod p) is a pseudo-random function [20] . 
Send gy to party B. The indirection step of computing gx allows to use the same table T prepared in an initialization phase for multiple queries. Thus, the complexity of generating T can be amortized over a certain number of operations, yielding to a good practical performance. However, if T is used multiple times, there is a chance that a single value will be requested more than once. This information will be leaked to party B. Depending on the application scenario, this may be acceptable if this event happens rarely. Note that party B will have no information which value was queried more than once; furthermore, he will not learn any information on values queried only once. To limit this information flow, the 
. As party A used the same value k when generating the table T , party A will retrieve a correct encryption of f (x). Security. The table T itself does not leak any information: the first row consists only of pseudo-random elements, whereas the second one contains semantically secure Paillier encryptions.
On computation of the value gx, information can only be leaked when party A decrypts the value [y ] or when party B obtains the value gy. However, the value y is obfuscated by multiplicative blinding and therefore is indistinguishable from a value chosen uniformly at random from Zn. Furthermore, under the Decisional q-Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption (see [20] ) party B can not, in particular, compute the discrete logarithm for gy to base g in Zp, thus no information can be inferred from seeing gy.
Optimizations. As T can become very large, depending on the choices made for f and X, we present several optimizations to the OPRF construction which help to decrease the size of T . 
IV. SECURE COMPUTATIONS ON REALS
In this section we present a framework which allows two parties to perform secure computations on values from some interval D = [− ; + ] ⊂ R. Note that we describe the framework in its full generality; in case that computations are performed only on a limited set of numbers (e.g., only on probabilities in the interval [0; 1]) further optimizations are possible.
IV-A. Data Representation
We start by giving a description of how values from the real domain D will be represented. We require the representation to meet the following conditions:
• First, the scheme should allow a representation as integer values, in order to use efficient methods from generic Secure Multiparty Computation for some sub-problems.
• Second, the representation should have a similar behavior as floating point arithmetic: the precision for numbers close to 0 should be higher than for numbers far away from 0. This is desirable in order to achieve a bounded relative error when representing both very small and rather big numbers.
• The data encoding should allow us to perform certain arithmetic operations directly on the encoded values. Our solution to this problem builds on the work of Kingsbury and Rayner [21] . We use a logarithmic representation for the numbers in the interval D = [− ; ] with > 0. Let S ∈ N be a scaling factor, B > 0 a suitable base for some logarithm and C be a constant with C ≥ . We represent a value x ∈ D as a tuple (ρx, σx, τx). Here, ρx ∈ {0, 1} is a flag indicating whether the represented number is zero, i.e., ρx = 1 if x is not equal to zero and ρx = 0 otherwise. Similarly, σx encodes the sign, i.e., σx = 1 if x ≥ 0 and σx = −1 otherwise. If ρx = 1 we compute an encoding τx of the absolute value as τx = −S · log B ( 
IV-B. Parameters
According to the desired level of accuracy and the size for the interval of represented numbers the parameters S, B, C and κ can be adjusted. We first note that for each pair (S1, B1) and a base B2 there exists a unique S2 such that S1 log B 1 (x) = S2 log B 2 (x) for all x ∈ R + . Thus it suffices to consider only one fixed base B and adjust the parameters S, C and κ accordingly.
The relative distance Δx/x between two subsequent numbers in D , which can exactly be represented in our encoding, is
and thus depends only on B and S. To achieve a fixed maximum relative error Δx/x it thus suffices to fix a base B and compute S as S = −(log B (1 − Δx/x)) −1 . For example, for a base B = 2 and scaling factor S = 100, the maximal relative representation error is given by 6.9 · 10 
IV-C. Arithmetic Operations
We will now describe how to perform basic arithmetic operations on encoded values x, y ∈ Lκ.
Multiplication and Division. Due to the logarithmic representation it is quite easy to compute an encoding xy of the product x · y, given encodings x and y. Let τ C 2 = S · log B (C) . The function
LPROD(x, y) = LPROD((ρx, σx, τx), (ρy, σy, τy))
= (ρx · ρy, σx · σy, τx + τy − τ C 2 ) = xy (2) achieves the desired functionality. Note that LPROD(x, y) = xy: If either x = 0 or y = 0, then also xy is an encoding of zero, and if both x, y = 0 then
Dividing two numbers x, y ∈ Lκ with y = 0 is similar:
Addition and Subtraction. Given x and y, computing x + y and x − y, which will be denoted by LSUM and LSUB in the sequel, is more involved. We first note that in order to compute a subtraction, it suffices to swap the sign σy of y and then perform an addition. Thus we limit ourselves to describe the addition here. The new sign of σx+y of the value x + y depends on the values σx, σy as well as τx and τy. Let λ1, λ2 ∈ {0, 1}, where λ1 = 1 if τx < τy and λ1 = 0 otherwise, and λ2 = 1 if τx = τy and λ2 = 0 otherwise. Then σx+y = σx + λ1 · (σy − σx). The new value ρx+y can be obtained by
For x, y = 0 with the same sign, τx+y can be computed using the Kingsbury-Rayner-Formula [21] :
If the signs of x and y differ, we have
This leads to the general formula for arbitrary x and y:
IV-D. Secure Operations
In this section we describe how to perform secure computations on values that are represented by the encoding described in Section IV-A. In this paper, we assume a two-party scenario, where computation is interactively performed by parties A and B. Party A has generated secret keys in the past and is thus the only party who has access to the private key. We encrypt each component of x ∈ Lκ separately and denote the encryption
Multiplication and Division. The arithmetic operations LPROD and LDIV can be computed in a straightforward manner by utilizing the properties of homomorphic encryption (see Section II) to implement Equations (2) and (3). The product operation requires two secure binary multiplications:
For y = 0 the division can be computed by:
Subtraction. As noted above, the operation LSUB can be transformed into a sum LSUM by using the homomorphic properties of the encryption: 
which directly evaluates Equation (7) (8), which requires 4 secure multiplications.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present experimental results to show that the framework introduced in Section IV yields efficient solutions that enable the processing of encrypted real-valued signals. To this end, we first consider the complexity of the basic operations and subsequently show that the framework can be used to filter digital signals privately and accurately.
V-A. Experimental Setup
The framework for privacy-preserving arithmetic operations, as described in Section IV, has been implemented in C++ using the GNU GMP library version 5.0.1, in order to determine performance and reliability. Tests were performed on a computer with two 2.1 GHz AMD Opteron quad-core processors and 4GB of RAM running Linux. Both parties A and B were modeled as different threads of one program, exchanging messages with each other; thus the reported computation complexities do not include network latency. To each thread we assigned some helper threads which allowed to distribute the computational load on multiple cores; in particular, independent operations (such as pre-computing randomness for Paillier encryption or tables for the LSUM operation) were performed in parallel, to obtain an equally distributed load on all cores.
V-B. Complexity of LSUM
Since computing the sum of two encoded elements is the most complex basic operation, we focus on an analysis of LSUM, implemented by the OPRF construction of Section III including all mentioned optimizations. Its memory usage and computation complexity is dominated by storing and computing the operations. We see that the latter indeed scales perfectly linear with the table size, while 147 to 306 secure LSUM operations can be performed within one second on the tested hardware platform. Note that there is a tradeoff between accuracy and complexity. The number of values of the interval D that can be represented without error in our encoding is determined by both the table size |T | and the parameter S. The larger this number, the better the accuracy, due to smaller rounding errors. At the same time, complexity of the LSUM operation grows linearly in |T |.
V-C. Digital filters
In order to demonstrate the reliability of the proposed framework, we consider the use case of digitally filtering encrypted realvalued signals. In particular, we have implemented an averaging filter fn(x) = n i=1 1 n xi and tested its performance when applied to signals whose components xi are randomly chosen positive 8-bit numbers. We fixed the parameters of the number representation as B = 2.71 (i.e. we use the natural logarithm) and consider the cases of S1 = 60, S2 = 120 and S3 = 500. For each parameter Si, the table sizes T1 = 500, T2 = 1200, T3 = 5000 were chosen in a way that they can represent the smallest and biggest value occuring during the computation. Figure 2 depicts the relative error of the filtered signal coefficients, when compared to a standard floating point implementation: the x-axis depicts the length of the filter (and thus the number of dependent operations) and the y-axis plots the relative error. We repeated the experiment 20 times with randomly chosen signals and depict the average relative error as well as the maximum and minimum values. The experiments show that for even small values such as 1 n = 1 800 = 1.25 · 10 −3 accurate results can be achieved (with a relative error of less than 1% for S = 500).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented for the first time a framework that allows to compute securely with values taken from a real interval in a numerically stable way. To be able to process both very small and very large values, we chose a logarithmic encoding and provided secure two-party protocols to perform all arithmetic operations on encoded values in an oblivious way. To demonstrate its practicality, we implemented the framework and performed measurements to show that the most complex operation (the addition) can be performed in a reasonable amount of time; furthermore we analyzed the propagation of quantization errors when applied to the problem of privately filtering signals.
